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This exploratory research builds upon the modelling research into the critical irifYastructure inter-
relationships dependency and interdependency relationship issues identified by Pye and Warren (2005) 
who proposed that these relationships could be modelled graphically to better represent and identify 
the existence and likely impact of these relationships on the continued delivery of services provided by 
Australia's critical irifrastructure. This research will expand further to determine the effectiveness of 
applying two such modelling approaches. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
If one takes a holistic, non-specific scenario based view of the functional aspects of Australia's critical 
infrastructure, one realises that it consists of a number of elements functioning separately and yet also 
reliant in some aspect upon each other to operate as one large complex open system to deliver their 
services. This is illustrated in the model developed by Pye and Warren (2005) that identified the 
differing levels of critical infrastructure existing within the Australian context. Furthermore from a 
security and protective aspect, this research also identified that while inter-relationships of dependence 
exist, they need to be identified and modelled so their effects can be taken into consideration when 
developing contingency strategies against partial or whole infrastructure failure. 
It is proposed that dependence relationships between critical infrastructures can be modelled 
graphically as a means of initially delivering a simplified abstraction of the existence of a relationship/s 
between critical infrastructure systems. In presenting relationships in this manner we can appreciate 
their existence and begin to extrapolate the extent of their influence and additionally, this can lead to 
further modelling opportunities to enable deeper analysis of the potential influences exerted by critical 
infrastructure inter-relationships. 
Initially we shall review our understanding of critical infrastructure inter-relationships before moving 
on to expand upon the potential implications of exploited vulnerabilities or failures, how the effects of 
such disruptions may impact upon associated critical infrastructure elements and the possible effect on 
continued service availability of the element within the associated critical infrastructure level or the 
infrastructure system as a whole; 
It is proposed that Entity-Relationship Diagrams (ERD) (Satzinger et al 2004) can be utilised initially 
to graphically represent and model inter-relationships between critical infrastructure elements. 
However, to validate this technique we must initially establish working parameters for the appljcation 
of ERDs and then apply these principles to a critical Infrastructure inter-relationship example, to 
validate the relevance and practicality of modelling critical infrastructure inter-relationships using 
ERDs. 
The next step is to investigate whether the modelling attributes of Petri Nets (Peterson 1977) and their 
parameters can enhance or build upon ERD modelling of critical infrastructure inter-relationships by 
applying the modelling techniques of Petri Nets to the same critical infrastructure inter-relationship 
example as the ERDs. Then through critical examination, it should reveal the relevance and practicality 
of Petri Net modelling for depicting critical infrastructure inter-relationships. 
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Finally conclusions will be drawn on the potential value of modelling critical infrastructure inter-
relationships and whether these modelling techniques deliver insight and the required perceptiveness to 
permit such modelling, to contribute to an improved representation and greater· understanding of the 
functionality and influence of inter-relationships between elements of Australia's critical infrastructure 
and ultimately its protection. 
2 CRITCAL INFRASTRUCTURE RELATIONSHIPS 
In tenns of critical infrastructure relationships it is acknowledged that Australia's infrastructure owners 
are to some extent dependent on the continued supply of electricity, water, fuel, infonnation systems 
and emergency services to name a few. Furthermore some infrastructure services such as electricity, 
transport and telecommunications are also mutually dependent on the security of their supply for their 
continued function (NCTC 2004). 
These relationships that can exist between critical infrastructure elements are categorised and termed as . 
either dependency or interdependency. In general tenns dependence can be defined as "the state of 
relying on or being controlled by someone or something" (pearsall p.495 1998), while interdependence 
is regarded as "(of two or more people or things) dependent on each other" (Pearsall p.951 1998). 
Furthennore, it should be noted that these terms tend to be used interchangeably within the subject" 
literature and therefore each tenn needs to be clearly characterised to describe a specific relationship 
type when applied to critical infrastructure inter-relationships. 
2.1 Characterising a Dependency Relationship 
A critical infrastructure dependency relationship can be detennined as a relationship that displays a 
reliance or influence of one infrastructure level or sector over another or multiple thereof, for the 
continued availability of service. This relationship would be characterised as a heavily biased or one-
sided relationship, where one side of the infrastructure relationship is heavily reliant on another 
infrastructure's service provision, however the dependence may not be mutually reliant to the sante 
extent in return (Pye & Warren 2005). 
2.2 Characterising an Interdependency Relationship 
If the critical infrastructure dependency relationship was mutually reliant meaning that the dependency· 
between infrastructures was found to be more equitably distributed between participating 
infrastructures, then this relationship should be regarded as an interdependency relationship. In this 
case the participating infrastructures are deemed to be mutually reliant upon each others operation for 
their continued availability, functionality and delivery of services (Pye & Warren 2005). 
2.3 Critical Infrastructure Relationship Exemplars 
Therefore applying the established characterisations of what a dependency and interdependency 
relationship is we can contend hypothetically that the effects of an infrastructure failure, regardless of 
magnitude, depending on the relationship characterisation with other infrastructure, can potentially 
impinge upon or have a detrimental effect or impact on the continued availability and functionality of 
participating infrastructures. 
For example a dependency relationship may be characterised as existing between the electricity 
infrastructure and an Internet-based electronic supply chain infrastructure supporting a number of 
supermarkets to deliver food provision services to their customers. In this instance if the electrici~ 
supply is removed for an extended period of time, then the electronic functionality of the supply challl 
also becomes non-existent, which in tum would result in electronic orders not being communicated to 
supply chain partners and consequently the food would not reach the supermarket shelves and its 
customers. 
Although a simplistic example, this characterises the one-sided nature of this dependency r~latlOnsht~ 
because of the dramatic effect to the supply chain infrastructure functionality and avadablbty, 
electricity is removed. Yet if the situation was that the supply chain infrastructure had failed lll1t1allY, 
then the effect on the continued availability of the electricity supply and its infrastructure would be 
negligible. It should be noted that in this example there is a delayed feedback over time, because Ill:: 
event of a failure in the food supply, this would eventually impact upon the electricity supply as art6 
human operators would be forced to seek food as a priority over the continued maintenance 
operation of the electricity supply. However, this hypothesis is not taken into consideration here as it 
adds complexity that is not considered in this high-level example. 
Alternatively, an interdependency relationship may be characterised as existing between the 
information technology infrastructure and the telecommunications infrastructure. The interdependency 
relationship is characterised by the fact that if either infrastructure was to become unavailable, then the 
effect on the other infrastructure would be dramatic and consequently affect the continued service 
availability of the associated infrastructure. This indicates that a mutual interdependen~e can exist 
between infrastructures where they are both mutually reliant on each other for continued availability 
and provision of services delivery. 
So having provided simple exemplars of infrastructure relationship assumptions to explain the potential 
impacts that can exist within dependency and interdependency relationships between participating 
infrastructures, it is now appropriate to apply modelling techniques to represent these relationships 
graphically and to ascertain the productiveness of the modelling techniques involved. 
3 ENTITY-RELATIONSHIPS DIAGRAM (ERD) MODELLING 
The utilisation of ERDs enables us to model the conceptual relationships that exist between entities, or 
real-world artefacts and conceptualise these with the application of symbolic notatio~ to simplistically 
represent the existence of a relationship pictorially between chosen entities (Satzinger et aI2004). 
3.1 ERD Modelling Notations 
The following symbol notation shown in Figure 1 will be used to represent the components 
descriptively within the ERD. The rectangle symbol embodies the Entity and its name, while the 
diamond symbol represents the Relationship with a descriptive word or phrase of the relationship that 
exists between two entities (Nickerson 2001). The diamond inside the rectangle symbol represents a 
Composite Entity - Relationship that can be used to model situations where both an entity and 
relationship exist together as one unit and also contains a descriptive word or phrase (Rob & Coronel 
1997). 
M N 
Figure 16 Entity and Relationship Symbols (Rob & Coronel 1997). 
Lines are then inserted to link together the entity and the relationship symbols as part of the model to 
indicate the relationship or association that is being modelled between the infrastructure entities and the 
classification of the relationship, such as (Rob & Coronel 1997): 
M:N - many to many; 
l:M - one to many; 
1:1 - one to one. 
Having established the ERD notation that may be used to model relationships, it is important to apply 
this notation as a representation of our earlier relationship exemplars. 
3.2 ERD Model of Dependency 
The following Figure 2 illustrates how ERD's can be applied to describe and show the dependency 
relationships that exist between infrastructures using the previously described dependency relationship 
example (see 2.3). 
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Figure 17 ERD Infrastructure Dependency Relationship (Rob & Coronel 1997). 
Figure 2 attempts to indicate the one-sided dependency relationships that can exist between 
participating infrastructures in this simplified example. As the product delivery of food supply services 
to the supermarket in this instance, is heavily reliant on the availability and functionality of many 
electronic supply chains, which in turn is also heavily dependant on the availability of an electricity 
supply infrastructure for its own continued operation. 
Upon consideration of the resultant ERD model in Figure 2 it is evident that there are limitations in 
modelling infrastructure relationships in the applied example using ERD principles. In this particular 
instance the biased infrastructure dependency example does not appear to be conducive to modelling 
using ERD techniques and notation and this is in part due to the bidirectional characteristics of the 
ERD notation indicating a relational connection between participating infrastructure entities. Therefore 
this lack of direction can not adequately represent the one-sided or biased nature of this relationship 
example, however ERD modelling techniques still need to be applied to modelling a critical 
infrastructure interdependency relationship to gauge applicability in this situation. 
3.3 ERD Model of Interdependency 
Again ERD notation have been applied in Figure 3 to depict and represent interdependency relationship 
that may exist between participating infrastructures that are mutually dependant on each other for their 
continued services provision and availability, as explained in the previously described interdependency 
relationship example (see 2.3). 
Infonnation 
technology 
infrastructure 
M N Telecommunication 
infrastructure 
Figure 18 ERD Infrastructure Interdependency Relationship (Rob & Coronel 1997). 
In this example, Figure 3 illustrates the mutually dependency characterised by an interdependency 
relationship that exists between infrastructures and using the ERD notation. This ERD example depicts 
an interdependent relationship that exists between the information technology infrastructure and the 
telecommunication infrastructure and therefore represents the mutually dependent operational 
relationship that exists between the infrastructures, thus inferring that if one infrastructure fails then 
both infrastructures will become unavailable and cease to deliver their services. 
In this example Figure 3 indicates that ERD modelling techniques may quite adequately represent high-
level interdependency relationships between participating infrastructures by indicating that many 
information technology infrastructures are mutually dependent on many telecommunication 
infrastructures. Although it should be noted that this application is a relatively simplistic and hence we 
have refrained from becoming overly complex and remained within the sphere of only depicting high-
level overviews of the chosen infrastructures. 
Unfortunately, ERDs can only represent the dependency relationship as a static instance and do not 
necessarily represent the occurrences, events or the information interaction flow between the 
infrastructures modelled, however this modelling capability may be provided by Petri Nets and this 
merits further investigation. 
4 PETRI NET MODELLING 
Petri Nets provide us with an abstract modelling system that permits us to represent information flow 
and control within a system and between systems that may exhibit asynchronous, parallel, concurrent 
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activities, constraints and other behaviours, thus enabling us to represent the dynamic aspect of the 
system (peterson 1977). These characteristics represent an opportunity to explore the potential 
application of Petri Net modelling to critical infrastructure relationships, by allowing us to potentially 
model in further detail the influencing relational dynamics of infrastructure dependency relationships. 
4.1 Petri Net Modelling Notations 
Petri Nets are used to model static properties of a dynamic system in a series of differing states and this 
is achieved using the notation symbol in Figure 4. Petri Net nodes are represented by Circles called 
'places' and Bars are referred to as 'transitions' and additil;,mally the nodes are connected together 
using directional Arrows called 'arcs' and finally the Black Dot is termed the 'token' and resides in the 
circle or place nodes. As a consequence of using tokens in this particular manner, this Petri Net version 
is also known as "Black and White" (sic) or "Marked Petri Nets" (Peterson 1977). 
0 I ~ • 
Place Transition (t) Arc Token 
f_\ 
Figure 19 Petri Net Modelling Symbols (Peterson 1977). 
There are a number of rules that need to be observed when modelling with Marked Petri Nets. For 
instance tokens are moved by firing a transition within the net, but a transition must be enabled first 
before it can fire. Therefore a transition is considered enabled, when all its input places contain a 
token. If this condition is met, then the transition fires and removes all the tokens from the transition's 
input places and generates new tokens that are deposited in the output places of the transition (peterson 
1977). 
Therefore by modelling our previous infrastructure relationship examples using Marked Petri Nets and 
observing the token pl~cements and subsequent firing of transitions, we can represent a number of 
differing static properties or states of our previous infrastru9ture relationship examples (see 2.3). 
4.2 Marked Petri Net Modelling of Dependency 
In this instance we will again be exploring and modelling the pervious infrastructure dependency 
relationship examples utilising the modelling representation of Black and White or Marked Petri Nets 
to illustrate the dynamic properties of the infrastructures through a number of states and in these Petri 
Net models there is no inherent value placed on the Token. 
Once again we are will be modelling the exemplar of the one-sided infrastructure dependency 
relationship of Electricity Supply (PI) and the Electronic Supply Chain (P2) and the subsequent service 
provision of food to the Supermarket (P3) and its associated customers as established in original 
exemplar in section 2.3 of this paper. Additionally, the functionality of the system being modelled 
using Petri Nets can be further illustrated and described using a Truth Table as shown in Table 1, to 
further clarity of its operation. 
Electricity Supply Electronic Supply Chain Product Delivery to Supermarkets 
Infrastructure (pI) Infrastructure (p2) for food supply Services (p3) 
Token True 
Token Token True 
False 
Table 2 Truth Table Infrastructure Dependency Relationship 
Table 1 illustrates that the electricity supply is critical to the Supermarket selling food, but to a reduced 
extent the electronic supply chain is of lesser consequence, when it could be surmised that the 
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Supermarket would have a limited amount of food in stock that may last for a number of days, if the 
electronic supply chain became unavailable for an extended period of time. 
Taking this information described in Tablel, we can then apply this to a Petri Net model of this same 
infrastructure dependency relationship example to represent a number of states that illustrate the 
dynamics of the dependency relationship, as depicted and addressed in Figure 5 below. 
State 1 
State 
Source Sin 
State 
Figure 20 Petri Net Infrastructure Dependency Relationships (Peterson 1977). 
Figure 5 represents the various states of the modelled biased dependency relationship between the 
electricity supply infrastructure and the electronic supply chain infrastructure supporting a number of 
supermarkets to provide food for their customers. 
In State 1 of Figure 5, we observe that the electricity supply place (PI) is enabled with a token, 
therefore transition (tl) can fire and electricity is supplied to the electronic supply chain place (P2) and 
the Supermarket place (P3), as shown in State 2 of Figure 5. Now that the electronic supply chain place 
(P2) is enabled with a token, transition (t2) can fire and enable the electronic supply chain to function 
correctly with the supermarketpiace (P3), as depicted in State 3 of Figure 5. 
Having mapped the dependency relationship between the infrastructures in this simple example we can 
observe that the dependency relationship is one-sided, as indicated by the direction of the arcs within 
the Petri Net model. This indicates that the electronic supply chain and supermarket are more heavily 
reliant on the continued supply of electricity services for their continued functionality and provision of 
their services, than the electricity supply infrastructure would be on the services provided by the 
electronic supply chain and supermarket. 
4.3 Marked Petri Net Modelling of Interdependency 
Once again the principles of Petri Net modelling will be applied to illustrate and represent that an 
interdependency relationship can exist and the continuation and supply of services can be mutually 
dependant on the continued availability of infrastructure services. The truth table in Table 2 describes 
the three states that can exist within this interdependency example (see 2.3) involving information 
technology infrastructure and telecommunication infrastructure systems. 
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Information Technology Telecommnnication Service Delivery (P3) 
Infrastructure(p 1) Infrastructure (p2) 
Token False 
Token False 
Token Token True 
Table 3 Truth Table of Infrastructure Interdependency Relationship 
Table 2 demonstrates the constraint of an interdepen,dency relationship as in this situation there is a 
need for both the information technology infrastructure and the telecommunication infrastructure to be 
functioning as expected before the delivery of services can take place, which is being illustrated in 
figure 6. 
State 1 
State 2 
State 3 
Figure 21 Petri Net Infrastructure Interdependency Relationship (Peterson 1977). 
State I depicts that even though the information technology place (PI) is enabled, transition (tl) will 
not fIre until State 2 is reached, where both information technology place (PI) and telecommunications 
infrastructure place (P2) is enabled, at which time transition (tl) will fire allowing infrastructure 
services to be delivered as depicted in State 30fFigure 6. 
Again it should be noted that the infrastructure dependency relationship examples modelled here are 
simplistic in nature and deliver only a high-level overview of the infrastructure relationship modelled, 
therefore further investigation is required to determine the potential for scaling up the modelling 
domain with more complex infrastructure relational situations to determine if this action becomes 
unworkable or overly complex and impractical to model, further investigation is needed. 
5. CONCLUSION 
This exploratory research is still in the early stages of development and therefore cannot be regarded as 
providing the definitive answers to modelling these relational problems between critical infrastructures, 
however this may yet prove to be beneficial in the targeted modelling of specific relationships within 
the critical infrastructure system and furthermore, be applicable to scaling up in relational complexity 
to model multiple interactions of infrastructure relationships. 
The obvious research outcome of this investigation is that it is evident that ERD modelling principles 
applied to this area of research are very limited in application and are not really effective at clearly 
representing the dependency relationships between participating infrastructures at an overview or high-
level. It is also apparent that ERDs are also restricted to depicting only the existence of a static 
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relationship and therefore cannot take into accpunt any dynamic behaviour that may be exhibited by the 
related infrastructure systems. Alternatively, Petri Nets can display dynamic characteristics and 
information flow that is advantageous to modelling the dependency relationship interactions between 
infrastructures. Furthermore, it may become apparent that Petri Nets may be able to represent critical 
infrastructure relationships.at both the overview level and the low-level interface too, because Petri 
Nets can permit the incorporation of additional modelling of other associated or multiple infrastructure 
systems to map their potential influence onto the original service delivery model domain. 
Currently, the exploratory research we have undertaken has only been applied using the Marked or 
Black and White Petri Net modelling version where no value is assigned to the token (Peterson 1977), 
but there is scope to apply Coloured Petri Nets that allows a value to be assigned to the token. 
Additionally, modelling these situations from an object-orientated perspective using Object Petri Nets 
(Lakos 1995) or even UML (Unified Modelling Language) modelling techniques by applying 
principles such as class diagrams incorporating cardinality .may represent an alternative method of 
modelling the high-level relationships between participating' infrastructures in a static representation, 
but this represents the focus of future research (Dennis et al 2005). 
It may eventuate that to represent the high-level and low-level relational interaction and influences of 
dependency relationships between participating infrastructures, may require the integration of 
modelling styles to present and model the effects of the relationship/s between critical infrastructures. 
Furthermore, scaling up of the modelling domain will introduce further complexity issues regarding 
inter-related infrastructures and whether the applied modelling schemes used here or in the future can 
deliver a workable model of the relational infrastructure, still requires further exploration. 
In closing, it is the view of the authors that there is merit in perusing this line of exploratory research 
further into modelling open systems in the fashion applied and proposed here to extend the research 
boundaries and even explore the development of a hybrid modelling system for depicting critical 
infrastructure scenarios that could be applied for computer simulation purposes and case study analysis 
to measure and observe the effects for planning and managing critical infrastructure failure scenarios. 
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